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Progress in the harmonization of
the international trading system has
stalled since the Doha Round negotiations, launched in 2001, failed to
produce any meaningful reforms of
the WTO and its sister institutions.
This is despite an underwhelming agreement reached in
Bali last December that achieved
the goal of trade facilitation
amongst WTO nations by streamlining customs practices and reducing quotas on agricultural goods
exported from developing countries
to developed countries. If properly implemented, this agreement
will certainly help increase global
economic activity, but in reality
it consists of only a small fraction of the reforms initially envisioned by policy makers at Doha.
At more than 12 years old,
many observers are starting to lose
hope the Doha Round will ever conclude, as policy makers are far apart
on issues relating to agricultural
subsidies and special treatment for
developing countries. To them the
agreement in Bali, while helpful,
will do little to assure a successful conclusion of the Doha Round.
Likewise, international businesses
and analysts believe this failure has
hurt the creditability of the WTO
as an engine of economic growth.
Supporters of liberal trade
and increased international regulatory synchronization should
not fear, however, for there lie
many paths to the laudable goal
of international economic liberalization. Currently two massive
trade deals are being negotiated
that will have colossal implications
for the future of the international
trading system. The first is the
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP),
a so-called NAFTA on steroids,
which will include 12 to 14 countries bordering the Pacific Ocean.

The second deal, the Transatlantic
Trade and Investment Partnership
(TTIP) between the United States
and Europe, will be the largest Free
Trade Agreement, in terms of total
GDP represented, ever negotiated. Together the TPP and TTIP
are expected to increase members’
GDP by at least $512 billion by
2025 ($223 billion for the TPP
and $289 billion for the TTIP).
In order to maintain the
post-World War II drive for international free trade and increase
global prosperity, policy makers
and academics should shift focus
from the WTO to regional agreements like these as vehicles for
international trade liberalization.
In addition to being easier to negotiate, these agreements allow skeptical states to opt out and pursue
the international trading strategies they believe to be best. Indeed
some scholars believe countries
with different levels of income
would benefit from trade strategies in line with their level of
development. However, within
the WTO, all countries follow the
same rules or else accrue unmanageable penalties. The proliferation
of these large regional trade agreements will permit nonparticipating countries to either create their
own rival agreement or conform
to the rules of the TPP and TTIP.
Nonparticipating countries will likely be attracted to these
new agreements and will implement the necessary policy adjustments in order to share the efficiency gains that come from international competition and regulatory synchronization, such as
cheaper goods and services that
will in effect increase the disposable
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income of all citizens. One by
one signatories to the TPP and
TTIP will increase and there will
be pressure to integrate the two
agreements, creating a trade bloc
that spans both the Atlantic and
Pacific Oceans that will not rival
the WTO but that will replace it.
The United States, at the
center of both agreements, fully
understands the future implications of successfully concluding
the trade deals. It has therefore
attempted to include provisions,
particularly in the TPP, that aim to
indirectly address the statist economic policies of its largest rival,
China, who is not included in
the agreement and therefore has
little say in the outcome. The first
provision would aim to limit the
number and extent of state owned
enterprises (SOEs), which are
abundant in the Chinese economy.
This effort to limit SOEs has run
into opposition because a few
of the potential TPP members,
including Vietnam, Malaysia,
and Singapore, have significant
number of SOEs. Additionally,
many view the US’s stance as
hypocritical considering the US
government’s strong presence in
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.
The second provision the
US is trying to implement is a
penalty against currency manipulation. This attempt by the US is
more obviously directed towards
China, as none of the TPP members
are suspected of strongly manipulating the value of their currency.
Once again, however, this stance
by the US is viewed as hypocritical
and unfair, especially because the
definition of currency manipulation provided by the US involves
the accumulation of foreign currency reserves, which the United
States, as the issuer of the international reserve currency, does
not hold in significant quantities.
Additionally, it may be difficult
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for the US to add such a provision
because of the difficulty of monitoring currency manipulation.
Even among economists, definitions of currency manipulation
are somewhat ambiguous, and
there are no agreed upon metrics
for determining whether or not
a country is artificially maintaining the value of its currency.
With regards to the TTIP, the
enthusiasm that excited business leaders following President
Obama’s 2013 State of the Union,
in which the deal was announced,
has dissipated as negotiations have
stalled. Of the more pressing issues
is the treatment of genetically
modified organisms (GMOs) in
European markets. Europeans are
fearful that the conclusion of the
TTIP will lead to the saturation
of their supermarkets with cheap
unlabeled American GMO products, which they believe would
be against the wishes of their
citizens and harmful to public
health. Indeed, many Americans
support the notion of mandatory labeling for GMO products.
However, there is broad scientific
agreement that GMO foods are
no more dangerous than conventional foods and have no adverse
health effects in humans. Thus it
would be mistake to require such
labels on agricultural products.
Rent seeking agricultural lobbies in Europe, which
have tremendous power in some
countries, also fear that the saturation of European markets with
American GMOs will damage
their livelihoods, which come from
non-GMO products. This line of
thinking is false and damaging to
the economic future of Europe. In
fact, competition from US agricultural goods should make EU firms
respond in two ways. First, they
will be incentivized to label their
products as “organic” or “made
without GMOs” and target the

large market (of which the author
is a part) for such goods on both
continents. Surely this response
would be better than requiring
mandatory labels for GMOs, as
it would increase emphasis on
the liberal aspects of the deal by
incentivizing companies to make
changes rather than emplacing burdensome regulations
on them. Secondly, European
farmers can begin to experiment and create GMOs that cater
to the EU market, of which they
should be experts. Both of these
options will increase the freedom
of choice and thus the well-being of both US and EU citizens.
Even if agreements on
certain issues cannot be reached
soon, negotiators need not let that
inhibit progress towards an eventual deal. Trade deals should not
be negotiated on an all or nothing
basis. Instead, negotiators should
first lock-in what can easily be
agreed upon and create a timetable to deal with other, thornier issues in the future. This will
help create momentum which
may ease tension during debates
on the more contentious issues. It
will also quicken the delivery of
economic benefits to businesses
that are looking for opportunities
to invest and expand, particularly
in an era when good investments
are otherwise becoming scarcer.
To help achieve support for
economic integration in the United
States, President Obama needs to
explain to US citizens that cheaper
imports will increase the disposable income of all Americans
and create jobs as American
firms will have greater possibilities to expand to foreign markets.
Furthermore, the President needs
to do a better job of convincing
high-ranking members of his own
party that increased international
trade will help promote domestic

prosperity and international
peace. Senate Majority Leader
Harry Reid and House Minority
Leader Nancy Pelosi opposed
potential legislation that would
grant President Obama Trade
Promotional Authority (TPA),
on the grounds that it would hurt
established domestic industries
that would be unable to compete
on the international market. With
the passage of such authority, the
President can avoid attaching

with the president holding TPA.
Even without TPA, optimistic forecasts have the conclusion of the TPP arriving in late
2014 and the TTIP sometime in
2015. While these forecasts are
little more than guesses, they do
highlight the fact that a post-WTO
world may be fast approaching. If
the US and the EU want to continue to direct the post war international trading system based on
liberal principles, they should be

which is 20 years old this year and
ready to be updated. The US and
EU would also do well to include
Canada and Mexico in the TTIP,
as they are not currently part of
the discussions. The future of
international trade looks bright at
this point early in the 21st century,
which is good news for those of
us looking to have a little extra
pocket money to spend on the
goods we buy everyday.

additional congressional amendments to trade deals and submit
the deals directly to congress for a
simple yes-or-no vote. Most analysts, though not all, agree granting the President TPA is essential
to successfully concluding these
trade deals. Trade deals in the
past have mostly been approved

motivated to conclude both agreements quickly. After their completion the two economic superpowers should look to harmonize
the two agreements and create a
free trade area that spans both
the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans.
Furthermore, the United States
should look to strengthen NAFTA

Et h an R o ut l e d g e s t u d i e s
International Commerce and
Quantitative Economics at the
Patterson School. In addition to
English, he is fluent in French
and has spent considerable time
in France and francophone
Switzerland.

Spring 2014 | 6

